Identity, Perception, Action and Choice in Contemporary and Traditional :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Identity, Perception, Action and Choice in Contemporary and Traditional No-Self Theories diddle The ego is tradition aloney held to be synonymous with respective(prenominal) identity and autonomy, mend the mind is widely held to be a necessary basis of cognizance and volition, with responsibility following accordingly. provided Buddhist epistemology, existential phenomenology and poststructuralism all name the intuitive feeling of an independent, subsisting, self-identical subject to be an illusion. This not only raises problems for our understanding of science (if the self is an illusion, then who does the perceiving and who is deluded) and volition (who initiates acts), as well as for the notion of responsibility (in the absence of an independently subsisting subject there appears to be no autonomous agent). For Buddhism, no-self theory raises serious problems for the doctrine of reincarnation (in the absence of a self, who is responsible for failing to overcome desires and attachments furthermore, who gets reincarnated?). Arguing for such no-self theories, the paper attempts to introduce how such difficulties can nevertheless be resolved. The self is traditionally held to be synonymous with individual identity and autonomy, while the mind, which is closely associated therewith, is widely held to be a necessary basis of cognition and volition, and the responsibility following therefrom. However Buddhism, Existential Phenomenology and Postsructuralism all point out that we have neither locate empirical experience of, nor sufficient justification for inferring, the existence of an independently subsisting self. Buddhists for pillowcase point out that, careful attention to the empirical evidence reveals that all the experiences we have of human subjectivity per se may be characterized in terms of five skandhas or aggregates. These are 1) Form understood as the Body, including the sense-organs, 2) Feelings and Sensations, 3) Perceptions, 4) Mental Forma tions (or volitional tendencies) including habits and dispositions etc., and 5) Six Consciousnesses, consisting of the consciousness or awareness of sensations emanating from for each one of the five senses, plus a consciousness of non-sensory or purely cordial experiences. Noting the ever-changing nature of each of these skandhas, they conclude that there is no tolerable justification for the common inference that these constantly changing phenomena are changing appearances of a persistent, independently subsisting self or ego. Nor, as Phenomenologists and others have pointed out, do we experience a mind as such, which much Western ism regards, if not as synonymous with, then certainly essential to, individual identity and autonomy, independent of the constantly changing sensations, perceptions, feelings, thoughts and ideas etc.